A new family of compromise solutions is introduced for the class of compromise admissible games. These solutions extend bankruptcy rules. It is shown that the compromise extension of the run-to-thebank rule coincides with the average of the extreme points of the core cover (taking multiplicities into account) and that this solution is characterised by means of a recursive formula.
Introduction
The model of bankruptcy situations as introduced by O'Neill (1982) is a general framework for various kinds of simple allocation problems. In a bankruptcy problem, there is an estate to be divided and each player has a single claim on the estate. The total of the claims is larger than the estate available, so one has to find criteria on the basis of which the estate is to be divided. In this context, many rules have been proposed to come to a fair allocation of the estate. For a recent overview of such rules, the reader is referred to Thomson (2003) .
A bankruptcy situation can be seen as the most basic form of an allocation problem. As a consequence, many bankruptcy rules have a straightforward interpretation and appropriate properties of such rules are easily formulated. In a transferable utility game, the allocation problem is of a more complicated nature: instead of each player having a single claim, each coalition of players has a worth which has to be taken into account. Our aim is to extend bankruptcy rules to the class of transferable utility games in such a way that both the interpretation and the appealing properties are maintained.
In this paper, we provide such an extension to the class of compromise admissible (or quasi-balanced) games (cf. Tijs and Lipperts (1982) ). Quant et al. (2003) study the compromise extension of the Talmud rule for the class of games for which the core coincides with the core cover. They prove that for this class of games the compromise extension of the Talmud rule coincides with the nucleolus. González-Díaz et al. (2003) introduce the compromise extension of the adjusted proportional rule and show that this solution coincides with the barycentre of the edges of the core cover. In the current paper, we look at the problem of extending bankruptcy rules from a more general viewpoint.
An important concept in the bankruptcy literature is duality (cf. Aumann and Maschler (1985) ). We use this notion to define for each rule a dual compromise extension and show that this solution coincides with the compromise extension of the dual rule.
We pay particular attention to one specific solution: the compromise extension of the run-to-the-bank-rule. We show that this solution is the average of the extreme points of the core cover (taking multiplicities into account) and characterise it by a recursive formula. This paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we present some basic definitions concerning transferable utility games and bankruptcy situations. In section 3, we define the concept of compromise extension and analyse the dual extension. Section 4 deals with the run-to-the-bank rule and shows that this solution is the average of the extreme points of the core cover. Finally, in section 5 we provide a recursive formula for the extension of the run-to-the-bank rule.
Preliminaries
For two sets A, B we denote A ⊂ B if for all i ∈ A we have i ∈ B. For finite A and two vectors x, y ∈ R A we write x ≤ y if x i ≤ y i for all i ∈ A.
A transferable utility game (in short TU game) is a pair (N, v) , where N denotes a finite set of players and v : 2 N → R is a function assigning to each coalition S ∈ 2 N a worth v(S). By convention v(∅) = 0. The set of all TU games with player set N is denoted by T U N . Where no confusion arises, we write v rather than (N, v) .
The minimum right of a player i ∈ N , m i (v), is the minimum value this player can achieve by satisfying all other players in a coalition by giving them their utopia demands:
The core cover of a game v ∈ T U N , CC (v) , consists of all efficient allocation vectors, such that no player receives more than his utopia payoff or less than his minimum right:
A game is called compromise admissible if it has a nonempty core cover. The class of all compromise admissible games with player set N is denoted by CA N . From the definition of the core cover it immediately follows that v ∈ CA N if and
The core cover is a polytope with at most |N |! extreme points. These so-called larginal vectors are introduced in Quant et al. (2003) and have been extensively studied in González-Díaz et al. (2003) .
An order on N is a bijective function σ : {1, . . . , |N |} → N . The player at position k in the order σ is denoted by σ(k). The set of all orders on N is denoted by Π(N ). For σ ∈ Π(N ), the larginal σ (v) is the efficient payoff vector giving the first players in σ their utopia demands as long as it is still possible to satisfy the remaining players with their minimum rights.
Let
It is readily seen that the core cover equals the convex hull of all larginals
This paper introduces a new type of allocation rule on CA N based on bankruptcy situations.
A bankruptcy situation is a triple (N, E, d), often abbreviated to (E, d) . N is a finite set of players, E ≥ 0 is the estate which has to be divided among the players and d ∈ R N + is a vector of claims, where for i ∈ N , d i represents player i's claim on the estate. It is assumed that the estate is not large enough to satisfy all claims, so E ≤ i∈N d i . We denote the class of all bankruptcy situations with player set N by BR N .
A bankruptcy rule f is a function f :
The worth of a coalition S is determined by the amount of E that is not claimed by N \S, so for all S ⊂ N ,
This class of games is a proper subset of the class of compromise admissible games.
Compromise solutions based on bankruptcy
This sections introduces a new class of solutions for compromise admissible games based on bankruptcy rules. Furthermore, we take a dual approach and show that for solutions based on self-dual bankruptcy rules, the two approaches coincide.
Bankruptcy rules can be extended to solutions on the class of compromise admissible games in the following way. Let f : BR N → R N be a bankruptcy rule. Then the compromise extension of f , f * , is defined by
for all v ∈ CA N . Note that because v ∈ CA N , the bankruptcy situation to which f is applied is well-defined. Generally, if f is a bankruptcy rule and f * is its compromise extension, then f * will be efficient ( i∈N f * i (v) = v(N ) for all v ∈ CA N ). The following lemma shows that if f is homogeneous of degree 1, then f * is relatively invariant with respect to strategic equivalence, ie, f * (kv + a) = kf * (v) + a for all v ∈ CA N , k > 0 and a ∈ R N .
then f * is relatively invariant with respect to strategic equivalence.
Hence, f * is relatively invariant with respect to strategic equivalence.
It is immediately clear that the compromise value (or τ value) introduced by Tijs (1981) is the compromise extension of the proportional rule, since τ is the efficient convex combination of the vectors M (v) and m(v). Quant et al. (2003) consider the compromise extension of the Talmud rule (cf. Aumann and Maschler (1985) ) for games for which the core cover coincides with the core. They prove that for this specific class of games the compromise extension of the Talmud rule equals the nucleolus. González-Díaz et al. (2003) study the compromise extension of the adjusted proportional rule (cf. Curiel et al. (1988) ) and show that it coincides with the barycentre of the edges of the core cover.
Another way to extend a bankruptcy rule to an allocation rule on CA N is to take a dual approach. Instead of first giving each player his minimum right and then dividing what is left, one could first give each player his utopia demand and take back the excess amount using f . This dual extension of a bankruptcy rule f , f , is defined by
The dual of a bankruptcy rule f (cf. Aumann and Maschler (1985) 
and a rule is called self-dual if f =f . As is stated in the following proposition, first taking the dual of f and then extending this rule yields the same solution as taking the dual extension of f . Proof: Applying the definitions yields
As a corollary, we obtain that if f is self-dual, then f = f * .
Run-to-the-bank rule
In this section we consider the compromise extension of the run-to-the-bank rule. We provide an interpretation in terms of larginals. 
.
Note that the RT B * solution coincides with the average of the larginals.
The RTB * solution is similar to the Shapley value in the sense that it is the average of all larginals (rather than marginals) 1 . This is shown in the following theorem.
Proof: Consider the game w defined by
As a result of Lemma 3.1, RTB * is relatively invariant with respect to strategic equivalence and hence,
A recursive formula of RT B *
In this section we give a characterisation of RT B * by means of a recursive formula, which is based on O'Neill's consistency property. The RTB rule is the unique bankruptcy rule satisfying the following property (cf. O'Neill (1982) ):
To extend this recursive expression to our framework of compromise admissible games, we have to define a subclass which is closed with respect to "sending one player away with his claim". For this, we need a nonnegativity condition (which is harmless as a result of relative invariance with respect to strategic equivalence) and a weak version of superadditivity. The class
We are going to characterise RT B * on A using the following extension of O'Neill's consistency property to a solution f on A: for all N , all v ∈ A N and all i ∈ N we have
where the game v j ∈ T U N \{j} is defined by
The game v j is again an element of A, as is shown in the following lemma.
Proof: It is immediately clear from the definition of v j (S) that v j (S) ≥ 0 for all S ⊂ N \{j}, so v j satisfies (i). We first show that we can restrict ourselves to the case that v j (N \{j}) > 0.
It follows from condition (ii) applied to (N, v) that for all S ⊂ N \{j} we have
from which it easily follows that
Hence, if v j (N \{j} = 0, then v j (S) = 0 for all S ⊂ N \{j} and v j ∈ A N \{j} follows trivially. So, assume that v j (N \{j}) > 0. It remains to prove that v j satisfies condition (ii) and that v j ∈ CA N \{j} .
Step 1: In order to show that v j satisfies (ii), we calculate M (v j ) and m(v j ).
Combining the two cases, we obtain
We next show that m i (v j ) = 0. To do so, we prove that for each S ⊂ N \{j} and i ∈ S we have
where
where the inequality follows from the definition of m i (v).
Case 2: There exists a k ∈ S\{i} with M k (v j ) = v j (N \{j}). Then
because of (2) and M (v j ) ≥ 0 for all ∈ N \{j}.
Hence, ρ S i ≤ 0 for all S ⊂ N \{j}, i ∈ S and m(v j ) = 0. Condition (ii) then directly follows from (2).
Step 2: We next show that v j ∈ CA N . We already have m(v j ) = 0 ≤ M (v j ) and i∈N \{j} m i (v j ) = 0 ≤ v j (N \{j}). Furthermore, for k ∈ N \{j} we have
Hence, v j ∈ CA N \{j} .
Because v j also satisfy (i) and (ii), we have v j ∈ A N \{j} .
The following theorem characterises RT B * on A.
Theorem 5.1 RTB * is the unique solution on A satisfying (1).
Proof: Let f be a solution on A satisfying (1). Then this uniquely determines the outcome of f for all one-player games and, by induction, for all games in A. Therefore, there can only be one rule that satisfies (1) on A.
Hence, it suffices to show that RT B * satisfies (1) on A. 
